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Music, Intelligence and Artificiality 
Alan Marsden 
Abstract 
The discipline of Music-AI is defined as that activity which seeks to program 
computers to perform musical tasks in an intelligent, which possibly means human-
like way. A brief historical survey of different approaches within the discipline is 
presented. Two particular issues arise: the explicit representation of knowledge; and 
symbolic and subsymbolic representation and processing. When attempting to give a 
precise definition of Music-AI, it is argued that all musical processes must make some 
reference to human behaviour, and so Music-AI is a central rather than a peripheral 
discipline for musical computing. However, it turns out that the goals of Music-AI as 
first expressed, the mimicking of human behaviour, are impossible to achieve in full, 
and that it is impossible, in principle, for computers to pass a musical version of the 
Turing test. In practice, however, computers are used for their non-human-like 
behaviour just as much as their human-like behaviour, so the real goal of Music-AI 
must be reformulated. Furthermore, it is argued that the non-holistic analysis of 
human behaviour which this reformulation entails is actually informative for our 
understanding of human behaviour. Music-AI could also be fruitfully concerned with 
developing musical intelligences which were explicitly not human. Music-AI is then 
seen to be as much a creative enterprise as a scientific one. 
Introduction 
Computers are machines. Intelligence is a human characteristic, and though it is 
often taken to be the characteristic which distinguishes us from animals, computers 
rarely approach the intelligence even of animals. One of the characteristics of 
machines is that they are man-made, and in that sense artificial (the sense of artificial 
as “unreal” will be discussed briefly below). The characteristic which distinguishes 
them from other artificial things is behaviour, and this characteristic is one which they 
share with humans and animals. In fact everything has behaviour, in that everything 
responds in a particular way in interaction with an environment: if one drops a ball it 
bounces; if one drops a glass it smashes. The real distinction between machines and 
other artificial objects cannot be made without reference to human values and 
“intentions”: we value machines because of their behaviour and not because of other 
characteristics (e.g. their shape, dimensions and solidity, as in the case of chairs). We 
use machines to extend our own behaviour. A class of machines which has become 
particularly important during this century is machines whose behaviour concerns 
information. This class contains such ancient machines as the printing press and such 
common ones as the telephone — it is a mistake to regard “information technology”, 
at least in this sense, as something new.  
The characteristic which computers have which is genuinely new, and which sets 
them apart from other information-processing machines, is that their behaviour is not 
only controllable by the user (this is an important characteristic of all useful 
machines) but that their behaviour is definable by the user. Other machines can have 
this characteristic, both information-processing machines and others, but only within 
tight constraints. In the case of a computer, on the contrary, its behaviour is highly 
unconstrained, at least in the domain of the processing of information (the 
possibilities for physical behaviour are usually very limited). In fact, the ideal 
computer is a “universal processing machine” which is capable of performing any 
kind of behaviour in the domain of abstract information processing. At the level of 
programming, the “input” which a computer reads is a definition of a kind of 
behaviour, or in other words, a definition of an abstract machine. If computers are 
thus intended to be able to mimic any kind of behaviour, it is not surprising that there 
should be interest in programming computers to behave in ways that are human-like 
and which could be called intelligent. There has also been interest in having 
computers perform musical tasks, whether it be playing music, processing music, or 
creating music. Whether behaving in a musical manner implies behaving in a human 
manner is discussed below. For now, it is sufficient to note that the combination of the 
two — the intention to behave in a human-like fashion and to perform a musical task 
— is the topic of this paper. 
History 
An argument is presented below that no attempt to have a computer perform a 
musical task can be totally unconcerned with the issues of Artificial Intelligence, but 
customarily Music-AI has included only those musical computer systems which have 
involved a degree of complexity which is not the complexity of mathematical 
formulae, nor the complexity of large quantities of data, but rather a kind of 
complexity of ideas. As in other domains, certain tasks have been considered to 
involve intelligence while others have not. (This is a problematic issue, which will be 
returned to below.) Sound synthesis, for example, is an area which has attracted a 
great deal of very successful work, but little of it is regarded as being in the domain of 
Music-AI because it has concerned acoustic and psycho-acoustic phenomena and the 
mathematics of signal processing rather than being concerned with thinking. 
Similarly, the vast area of systems for capturing, processing and using performance 
data via sequencers and the like is excluded from the domain of Music-AI, as are 
systems for music notation. A brief historical survey is presented here, organised 
around different architectures of system. 
Early attempts at programming computers to perform musical tasks took an 
algorithmic approach. The objective was to describe the procedures which must be 
performed in order to produce a musical result. An example of high-quality work of 
this kind can be found in the research of Longuet-Higgins and his co-workers 
(Longuet-Higgins, 1978; Longuet-Higgins & Steedman, 1971). The objective of this 
work was a system which could transcribe music played on a keyboard (the work 
began in the days before MIDI) to music notation. This involves resolving issues 
about the representation of pitch (should a note be written as C sharp or D flat, for 
example), which involves determining key, and issues about the representation of 
rhythm, which involves both determining metre and coping with the variations from 
metronomic playing of a real performance (which can be quite severe). Algorithms 
with a moderate to high degree of success for these tasks were designed and 
implemented in the language Pop-11. Projects which have also taken an algorithmic 
approach have been directed at tasks as diverse as composition (e.g. Ames & Domino, 
1992; Cope, 1991) and transcription of lute tablatures (Charnassé and Stepien, 1992). 
While this approach can produce good results, if those results are to be applicable in 
other programs to perform other tasks, then it is up to the researcher to make certain 
that the algorithms are suitably designed and explained. Some authors, (Longuet-
Higgins among them) are excellent at explaining what their algorithm does; others are 
not so. The algorithms themselves, without explanation, cannot be expected to be 
transferable to a program to perform another task, however similar. At issue here is 
really the nature of the principal objective of research in Music-AI. Is it to design and 
implement computer systems which perform musical tasks (an engineering objective), 
or is it to discover and explain the knowledge which underlies these tasks (a 
cognitive-science objective)? Most researchers would claim the latter, but this can 
only be tested by achieving the first objective to some degree also. 
While every computer program ultimately comes down to algorithms, there has 
been considerable interest in devolving the translation from knowledge to algorithm 
to the computer so that the representation in which a system is expressed can be more 
directly a representation of the knowledge underlying a particular task. A number of 
formalisms intended to achieve this have been designed. The one most often been 
used in music, usually because of a perceived similarity with language, has been 
formal grammars. Another early example of Music-AI is the harmonic analysis 
system of Winograd (1968). The core of this was a systemic grammar which 
described the configurations of chords, harmonies and tonalities possible in 
homophonic tonal music such as the chorale harmonisations of J.S. Bach. This gave 
an extremely clear exposition of the “knowledge” of tonal theory. The grammar could 
be applied in the analysis of a piece of music to discover how the grammar accounts 
for the piece, and thereby, by reporting the steps of the derivation, producing a 
harmonic analysis of the piece. However, many different analyses were possible for 
any one piece (musicians will be familiar with the idea of different possible analyses, 
but they might be surprised at quite how many were allowed by Winograd’s grammar, 
which was quite a faithful reproduction of classical tonal theory.) The part of the 
system which derived analyses, therefore, called the “parser”, had to be quite complex 
and make use of other, procedural, “knowledge” in order to arrive at harmonisations 
which were acceptable. In principle a grammar should be applicable in either 
direction, i.e. to either analyse music of produce music. It might be possible to use 
Winograd’s grammar to produce harmonisations, but Winograd did not attempt this. 
A well-known grammar which did produce music was that of Baroni et al. (1992), 
who produced a number of grammars to generate chorale melodies, eighteenth-
century French chansons, and the text repetition patterns of Legrenzi arias. In both 
Baroni et al. and Winograd’s work, the business of translating the grammar to an 
algorithm was not devolved to the computer, as suggested above, but coded by hand. 
In the case of Kippen & Bel’s Bol processor (1989, 1992), however, the computer 
system operated directly on the grammars. The Bol processor was a system intended 
to assist in the understanding of a style of tabla drumming found in North India. It 
was capable both of producing new pieces of music, and of analysing existing pieces. 
Their publications also include excellent discussions of the principles of using 
grammars in this kind of work and of some of the issues involved.  
Another formal systems for representing knowledge applied in Music-AI is KL-
ONE, a well-developed system of knowledge representation, derived from frames and 
semantic nets, which expresses knowledge in terms of concepts and roles, and defines 
inheritance and other relations between them. Here again, the intention is to allow a 
clear expression of knowledge which is susceptible to direct implementation by 
computer. Furthermore, this knowledge is, in principle at least, expressed abstractly 
without any reference to its application in any particular task. KL-ONE is used to 
provide the symbolic layer of HARP, a hybrid system applied to a number of musical 
tasks, often involving real-time interaction between a performer and a music-
production system (Camurri et al., 1994). 
One of the problems Kippen & Bel identified in developing their Bol-Processor 
grammars was the difficulty of knowing what should go into a grammar: how is the 
researcher to determine what the rules of the grammar should to be? The common 
paradigm has been to make a first attempt, to examine its results, then, on a rather ad 
hoc basis, to attempt some revisions to the grammar which will correct the errors of 
the previous results. The cycle of testing and revision then begins again. Such a 
strategy will probably never produce a perfect system, though it might approach 
perfection, but the ad hoc nature of the rule revision is disconcerting: how can the 
researcher have any confidence that the revisions are the best to propose in the 
circumstances? It is a characteristic of an intelligent animal that it learns from its 
experience and performs better next time in similar circumstances. In fact, this 
behaviour is more characteristic of intelligence than is behaving well in every 
circumstance. One of the goals of Artificial Intelligence, then, is systems that learn, 
and these can be found in Music-AI also. Kippen & Bel attempted to build learning 
into their system so that rule strengths could be adapted automatically and so that at 
least some of the new-rule generation process could be automated (1989). Musical 
learning systems, however, are best exemplified in the work of Widmer, who has 
completed projects which learn counterpoint rules (1992) and which learn expressive 
performance (1996). Cope’s EMI system (1991), which learns to compose music in 
the style of the music given to it, does not properly belong in this category of 
intelligent learning systems because the learning requires a considerable degree of 
input from the user of the system also. While it is true that intelligent animals often 
learn best with teachers, these teachers do not interfere with the functioning of the 
animal in any way other than the normal channels of interaction. (Teachers do not 
resort to brain surgery, in other words.) Furthermore, it is a characteristic of intelligent 
animals that they learn spontaneously, and it is this characteristic that is most sought 
in AI research in learning. 
A number of characteristics of intelligent behaviour, including the one of 
spontaneous learning just mentioned, gave rise at the end of the 1980s to a new 
paradigm in computing variously called connectionism, parallel distributed 
processing, and neural networks. Two of the most important motivations were the 
observation that intelligent behaviour could not possibly arise from the mechanisms 
proposed by traditional “sequential” AI approaches at the speed at which it does in 
animals. Furthermore, it is a characteristic of intelligent animals that, in surroundings 
which they have never before encountered, and therefore surroundings for which they 
have no perfectly applicable knowledge, they are able to perform tolerably well. 
Traditional AI systems, however, when presented with something somewhat different 
from their intended task, generally perform spectacularly badly. This is sometimes 
referred to as “brittleness”. In the new paradigm, which is clearly explained in Leman 
(1992) and other sources, the behaviour of a system results from the net effect of the 
behaviour of a number, possibly a very large number, of simple but interacting 
processing units. When appropriately configured, such systems are capable of 
learning, in the sense that their behaviour approaches the desired behaviour. 
Furthermore they typically perform moderately well with unfamiliar input rather than 
exhibiting the brittleness of classical systems. Such systems have been used with 
remarkable success in such diverse domains as tonal theory (Leman, 1994, 1995), the 
classification of timbre (Cosi et al., 1994), and the quantisation of rhythm (Desain & 
Honing, 1992). Desain & Honing (1992) include a direct comparison of a classical 
and a network system performing the same task. From the engineering perspective, 
such systems often perform well. From the cognitive-science perspective, however, 
they involve a total shift of philosophy. It in inappropriate to use a network system in 
the hope of discovering the rules of tonal harmony, for example, at least in the form 
that they are traditionally expressed. The “knowledge” which a network system 
acquires during its learning is distributed through the connections of the network; one 
cannot necessarily examine the state of the network after training and directly extract 
from it a rule in the form “if X then Y”, as one often can from a learning system based 
on classical computing.  
The philosophical shift has justifications other than the utility of such network 
systems, expressed in Leman (1993), Lischka (1991) and Kaipainen (1996), but it is 
important to realise quite how different it is from the cognitive science which gave 
rise to grammars, KL-ONE, and the like. Nor should it be thought that the new 
paradigm has supplanted or should supplant the former one. Much recent work 
involves both kinds of computing (e.g. Camurri & Leman, 1992 and Goldman et al., 
1995), often assigning “subsymbolic” processing to a network while “symbolic” 
processing is carried out using a more traditional kind of architecture. However, care 
must be taken in ensuring that the mixture of the two philosophies is sound if the goal 
of improving understanding musical behaviour — the cognitive-science goal which 
was argued above to the fundamental to Music-AI — is not to be compromised. 
Philosophy 
In a precise discussion of Music-AI, there are three terms to be defined: “music”, 
“artificial” and “intelligence”. Some adumbrated definitions were given above. 
“Artificial”, for example, was taken to mean man-made and not occurring naturally in 
the universe. By this definition music is also artificial, as is any other human product. 
A tightening of the definition is warranted, restricting the word “artificial” to refer to 
human products which are intended to emulate something else (which probably, but 
perhaps not necessarily, occurs naturally), hence artificial pearls, etc.  
“Music” is notoriously difficult to define (for a straightforward discussion of some 
of the issues, see Davies, 1978), but all agree that while it involves sound, it is 
impossible to define solely in terms of sound. The classic test case is John Cage’s 
4’33”, during the performance of which the only sounds heard are those which 
happen to occur in the environment — the performer is not instructed to make any 
sounds at all. If this piece, in which any sound can occur, is to be taken as music, then 
any sound is music and so all sounds are music. This is clearly unsatisfactory as a 
definition of the word as normally understood. Even if this extreme case is not 
admitted as a piece of music, it is not difficult to name pieces in which all kinds of 
normally non-musical sounds have been included, and it is extremely difficult to find 
physical differences between the sounds which characterise music and those that do 
not. Thus definitions of music generally make reference in some way or other to 
human activities, whether composition, performing or listening. If, then, the very 
definition of music requires reference to human activities, any computing system 
which is supposed to perform a musical task must also take account of those human 
activities. As an example, consider a sound-synthesis system, a common kind of 
musical computing system which is not normally considered an example of artificial 
intelligence. In designing any such system, choices must be made about the frequency 
ranges to be accommodated (and hence the sampling rates to be used). For a musical 
system, the appropriate choices are to set the frequency range to the maximum 
humanly audible range, since the results are intended to be listened to by people and 
not bats or any other animal with a different audible range. Pursuing the example 
further, suppose that the designer wishes the user of the system to be able to specify 
the sound output in terms of individual sound events, which we might call “notes”, 
and to specify the time of occurrence for each note. This will require some reference 
to the phenomena by which we segment a stream of sound into separate events, and 
also an understanding of where the perceived “start-time” of a note is in relation to the 
physical beginning of the sound, its amplitude envelope, etc. Going yet further, the 
user might want to be able to specify the grouping of notes into phrases and have this 
phrasing reflected in the synthesised sound. This would require an understanding of 
the relation of variations in timing and other factors to perceptions of phrase 
beginnings and endings (see Todd, 1985; Sundberg, Friberg, & Frydén, 1991). The 
point of the argument is that if any system is to be musical it must make reference to 
human behaviour, and to that extent any musical system must involve artificial 
intelligence. There is no obvious place at which to draw a boundary between where 
one must take into account human behaviour which is not intelligent, and where one 
must take into account behaviour which is intelligent. By this argument, furthermore, 
the discipline of Artificial Intelligence becomes not a peripheral specialisation but a 
core element of successful computer science. 
“Intelligence” is the most difficult of the three terms to define, and the one whose 
definition is most contentious. It was suggested in the introduction above that 
artificial intelligence meant programming computers to behave like people. Later, 
spontaneous learning and performing with moderate success in unfamiliar 
surroundings were suggested as characteristics of intelligent behaviour. A third 
definition is suggested by a common usage of the word “intelligent” with respect to 
software. An “intelligent help system”, for example, is one which determines the 
information to be provided to the user on the basis of the user’s recent activities. In 
other words the behaviour of the system is sensitive to its environment. This is true of 
every piece of software — its output it determined by its input — but here there is a 
significant difference in the domain of the input. Normally software uses a very 
restricted input; so-called “intelligent” software instead attempts to receive input from 
as much as possible of its environment. Clearly this is related to the definition of 
intelligent behaviour as performing moderately well in unfamiliar surroundings, 
because attention is payed to the totality of the surroundings. Furthermore, if the 
environment is taken to include the past, then this definition of intelligence as 
behaving appropriately in the environment will include learning also. However, 
computers generally have extremely limited channels for receiving input from the 
environment, and considerable work is needed in this area if we are to see behaviour 
which is really intelligent under this definition. In fact, if we really want an intelligent 
computer to behave in the same way in which a human would in a given environment, 
including that environment’s past, then the computer would have to have the same 
channels of input, the same memories, the same means of acting upon the 
environment, and indeed the same objectives. In short, the computer would be that 
person. Artificial intelligence under this definition, then, is an impossible goal. 
Some of these difficulties are overcome by limiting the channels of 
communication, as in the definition of intelligence encapsulated in the “Turing test”, 
proposed by Alan Turing at the very beginning of the discipline of Artificial 
Intelligence. The test is as follows. Two rooms have teletypes (the technicalities are 
not significant — any restricted means of communication usable  by both computers 
and humans would do) as the only means of communication with the outside world. 
In one room is a computer connected to the teletype, in the other a person. Those on 
the outside may ask questions via the teletype, in a restricted domain. If they cannot 
tell from the responses to the questions which room contains the computer and which 
the person, the computer has passed the test and may be described as intelligent. A 
musical version of this test could be proposed also. (For a similar argument making a 
point related to the one above about the essentially human nature of musical activity, 
see Cross, 1993.) Two rooms are set up with a channel by which music is 
communicated to the outside world. We might also allow a channel by which some 
sort of feedback (applause, perhaps, or other pieces of music) goes into the room. In 
one room is a composer; in the other is a computer. The test is passed when those 
outside the rooms cannot tell which contains the computer. While it might be possible 
for a computer to pass this test in practice (i.e. in an empirical sense), there is an 
argument that a computer could never pass the test in principle (i.e. in a rationalist 
sense). (While the test might appear inherently empirical, because it fundamentally 
involves observations, it is generally not conducted in practice but as a “thought 
experiment”, and so is not empirical at all.) It is often argued that originality is an 
essential characteristic of music. (From the perspective of composing, this is 
commonplace; for a perspective from listening, see Kunst, 1978). Computers are 
digital automata, and so their behaviour is always, in principle at least, predictable and 
therefore cannot be original. Thus a computer cannot, in principle, pass this test. 
There is a persuasive counter-argument that dynamic systems, and so-called chaotic 
systems in particular, can be deterministic, in the sense that their future state is 
entirely determined by their current state, but yet unpredictable. In fact such systems 
have been used for creating both music and visual art (the visual examples are quite 
well known; see Little, 1993 for a musical example). However, this depends, in 
principle, on the dynamic system operating in an infinite domain (e.g. using rational 
numbers), and computers can only simulate this by a finite domain of very many 
elements. The argument in principle, therefore, remains. The argument in practice will 
not be defended because clearly it is a hopeless task for a person to know all the 
details of the state of a computing system, finite as the number of possible states 
might be. Indeed, it is now to matters of practice that we will turn. 
Pragmatics 
If the goals of Music-AI suggested above — behaving in a completely human-like 
way and composing music indistinguishable from humanly-composed music — are 
impossible to achieve, what should Music-AI realistically aim at? In fact, we 
frequently want superhuman, and therefore non-human, behaviour from computers. 
We often want computers to process data in larger quantities, at greater speed and 
with greater accuracy than is humanly possible. In these cases, putting aside questions 
about whether the computer’s behaviour is really intelligent, it is precisely because it 
is artificial (other-than-human) that it is useful. Thus the real goal in developing a 
computer system is often for it to behave in a human-like manner in some respects but 
in a non-human-like manner in other respects. There are two difficulties of definition 
here. Firstly, the boundaries must be defined: in which respects is the behaviour to be 
human and in which respects is it to be super-human? Secondly, there is a difficulty in 
knowing what human behaviour is when constrained in the appropriate respects. We 
can realistically know what human behaviour is in total by observation. To observe 
only certain respects we are in danger of either getting a false picture or of distorting 
the behaviour so that it is no longer truly human. To take a concrete example, 
consider the case of designing a system which is to transcribe musical rhythms into 
notation. (For actual systems of this kind, see Lee, 1985 and Desain & Honing, 1992.) 
What is the human behaviour which the system is to mimic? We could attempt to 
answer this question by examining musicians’ transcriptions of actual music. But real 
music contains details other than rhythm, and these almost certainly have an influence 
on the transcription. We could expand the task domain of the system so that some of 
these other factors are taken into account, but, by the argument above, there will 
always be factors not taken into account. On the other hand we could attempt to 
answer the question by having musicians transcribe material in which these other 
details were neutralised (e.g., all pitches could be the same). Now, however, the 
musicians would not be dealing with real music and so would be performing an unreal 
task. Thus we are caught between having to deal with only partial information or 
information which is of doubtful validity. The behaviour of the computer system is 
thus artificial also in the sense that even the supposedly human-like part of its 
behaviour is not really human behaviour. 
Although this has been described as a problem (and it is a problem also for 
psychology), it can be turned into a virtue. While the arguments above would suggest 
a holistic approach to the study of human behaviour, it can be argued that the 
understanding we seek is not holistic but analytical. Indeed if we are to design 
computer systems which behave sometimes like humans and sometimes not, we need 
to have an analytical, piece-by-piece, understanding of human behaviour. While the 
artificial division of human behaviour described above is anathema to a holistic 
approach, it is an essential tool in an analytical approach. Anyone taking this 
approach has to accept the artificiality, but its effects can be reduced, for example, by 
taking “slices” of human behaviour in different ways and attempting to unify the 
results, thus neutralising the effects of ignoring relevant factors or of studying an 
artificial task. (The rhythm-transcription study alluded to above, for example, might 
examine the results of both of the kinds of investigation suggested there, and it might 
also take into account data from studies of the grouping of notes in the pitch domain, 
since grouping is probably a factor in rhythm transcription and we might presume that 
common grouping behaviours are used in both domains.) But, on the other hand, the 
artificial division of human behaviour can be regarded as a tool to reveal the 
component details of behaviour, like a kind of dissection. It is only when we impose 
an artificial task that we can begin to break down behaviour into manageable pieces. 
The arguments here are closely related to those between network computing systems, 
which operate in a holistic manner and suggest a holistic approach to behaviour, and 
symbolic systems which operate in a step-by-step manner and suggest an analytical 
approach. 
Finally we must consider the possibility that artificial intelligence is not 
necessarily a copy of human intelligence. The definition of intelligence as “behaving 
appropriately in the current environment”, discussed briefly above, does not make any 
necessary reference to humans, so long as we can define “appropriately” without 
reference to humans. Appropriate behaviour might be defined, for example, as 
behaving in a manner which leads to a certain goal. Again, most software does this; 
the difference in “intelligent” software is that its response to the environment is more 
perspicuous and its means of achieving goals more adaptive. This suggests the 
possibility of computer systems which behave intelligently, but which do so in a 
manner quite different from our own: artificial intelligence in which “artificial” means 
unreal and unusual as well as man-made. For musicians this is an attractive 
possibility, since it suggests the generation of entirely novel approaches to music, but 
approaches which, because they are intelligent, are interesting and productive. The 
most obvious application of this kind of system would be in composition, whereby 
entirely novel kinds of composition could be generated. (See Laske, 1989, for further 
discussion.) There could equally well be applications in analysis, where an objective 
is often to arrive at a novel understanding of a piece of music, whereby unforeseen 
approaches could arise. The same applies also to performance. 
By both of the last two arguments, the argument that artificial intelligence is an 
analytical tool for the study of behaviour, and the argument that artificial intelligence 
can be explicitly non-human, Music-AI becomes a kind of creative enterprise rather 
than a purely scientific one. Designing explicitly non-humanly intelligent systems is 
obviously a creative task. Using artificial intelligence as an analytical tool, however, 
is less clearly so. We only need recognise, though, that at each stage of the process of 
developing a system we are making choices: when deciding on the domain of the task; 
when deciding how to circumscribe and observe the human behaviour to be 
mimicked; when combining data from different kinds of observations. Overall, one is 
creating a perspective on, and model of, human behaviour. Neither is it immediately 
obvious that the criteria by which the perspective and model are to be judged are 
scientific ones and not artistic ones. It is not so bizarre, then, to couple the artistic 
realm of music and the science of computation into the enterprise of Music-AI. 
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